Gunther wrote:Throughout 1972 and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of UN Resolution 242 -- total Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in 1967. (Israel has defied 3xs more UN resolutions than Iraq)
So you're saying that Sadat whined to the US before
the Yom Kippur war as well as after actually getting his arse handed to him
. Sounds like a masculinity problem, huh? Too bad Sadat didn't have a little Jewish backbone in him, huh?
Gunther wrote:Despite the conventional wisdom that Israel was surprised by the attack that did eventually come, the truth is that the Israelis began to prepare for battle on October 5. But like U.S. intelligence officials, Israeli analysts were skeptical about the threat of war.
Yeah... most intelligent people would think that after the Egyptians got their teeth kicked in back in '67 that they couldn't possibly be that
stupid to try it again, could they???
Gunther wrote:At 5:00 a.m., General David Elazar, the chief of staff, first recommended a full, immediate mobilization of forces and a preemptive air strike. He was overruled. A few hours later, a partial call-up of reserves was approved, but Prime Minister Golda Meir still refused to authorize Elazar to take military action. She advised the U.S. ambassador of the situation and asked him to pass on the message that the Arabs should be restrained.
Code word for Golda saying "Hey, America, you might want to warn the little jewhater dogs over there in Egypt to keep off our lawn, remind them what happened in '67."
Gunther wrote:Vinogradov dispels the idea of surprise: in his view, both the canal crossing by the Egyptians and the inroads by Sharon were planned and agreed upon in advance by Kissinger, Sadat and Meir. The plan included the destruction of the Syrian army as well.
At first, he asks some questions: how the crossing could be a surprise if the Russians evacuated their families a few days before the war?
What, the Egyptians had Ruskie tanks and advisors
? No wonder they lost. Bad equipment and bad tactics.
Gunther wrote:The concentration of the forces was observable and could not escape Israeli attention. Why did the Egyptian forces not proceed after the crossing but stood still? Why did they have no plans for advancing?
Umm, cause they were stupid? Felt they had to go wail a little and bring their little prayer blankets to the battle? Saw the Israelis eye to eye and lost their nerve?
Gunther wrote:Why there was a forty km-wide unguarded gap between the 2d and the 3d armies, the gap that invited Sharon’s raid? How could Israeli tanks sneak to the western bank of the Canal? Why did Sadat refuse to stop them? Why were there no reserve forces on the western bank of the Canal?
The Egyptians were still used to having their butts handed to them by the Jews along the Red Sea. Remember what happened to them when Pharoh's army tried to mess with the Jews in the Exodus? Bet the Egyptian army had life preservers on the whole time!